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Back to Normal?  
The Future of Global Production Networks 
Olivier Godart, Holger Görg, Dennis Görlich 
Abstract 
Since the economic downturn started, exports have fallen dramatically and rapidly. One reason 
for this is the importance of vertical specialization, where the drop in demand for the final good 
induces a domino effect on to demand for intermediate inputs. Hence, the strong collapse in 
exports in the recent month is at least partly driven by the same forces that allowed global 
trade to expand much faster than global GDP in the last two decades, i.e. global production 
networks. One view is that after the crisis, these networks will bounce back and trade will be 
back to normal quite rapidly. We point out, however, that this may be an overly optimistic view. 
Building global production networks involves substantial set up costs that are often non-
recoverable. These might be sunk costs of exporting or sunk costs of foreign sourcing of 
inputs. The existence of such costs may make is unlikely that international trade relationships 
will restart as quickly once the economic situation improves again. Hence, the international 
crisis may have consequences that go well beyond the prediction of a standard economic 
model, when the presence of global production networks and sunk costs of building foreign 
trade nodes are taken into account. 
Introduction 
The current global economic crisis has again pushed the issue of international trade into the 
spotlight of public and academic debates. Since the economic downturn started, exports have 
fallen dramatically and rapidly. Figure 1 illustrates this dramatic decline: at the end of the  
1
st quarter of 2009, world merchandise exports have fallen back to the level of 2005, after a 
steady increase between 2005 and the 3
rd quarter of 2008. 
One may suggest that even though trade volumes have declined during the economic 
downturn, international trade will pick up again once the crisis is over. Indeed, in a standard 
economic model, downswings in business cycles reduce the demand for domestic and for-
eign goods, causing firms to reduce or put on hold their exports. During upturns, conversely, 
companies start to export again and expand further into foreign markets. 
While this line of argument may be appealing in light of the current international crisis, it 
neglects an important fact. Today’s world economy is characterized by high degrees of 
globalization of production, with firms exporting final goods around the globe and sourcing 
intermediate inputs from suppliers located in many countries. This is sometimes referred to 
as global production networks. The need to consider these networks stems from the fact that 
building foreign trade nodes involves a range of substantial set up costs that are often non-
recoverable. They are generally referred to as sunk costs. These might be sunk costs of 
exporting or sunk costs of foreign sourcing of inputs. The existence of such costs may make  120  After the Crisis: New Patterns in the World Economy 





























Source: WTO Secretariat, available at http://www.wto.org. 
it unlikely that international trade relationships will restart as quickly once the economic 
situation improves again. 
The questions this essay attempts to address are: what will happen to global production 
networks during and after the crisis? Are the predictions of the standard model the most 
likely outcome of the international crisis in the light of global production networks and sunk 
costs of building foreign trade nodes? 
To examine these questions, we will start with briefly charting the importance of global 
production networks, or international sourcing as it is also referred to, before the crisis. We 
then comment on the development during the crisis, and consider what may happen once 
the world economy leaves the current situation behind and picks up again. 
The Importance of Global Production Networks 
Global production networks are an important aspect of the current globalized world economy. 
This is evident not only from anecdotal evidence on where firms source their inputs, but also 
from more aggregate statistics on imports of intermediate products and international sourcing 
behaviour. 
The World Trade Organization (1998, p. 36) provides a good example of the extent of 
internationally linked production activities when it describes the geographic sources of inputs 
for the average American car: “30 % of the car’s value goes to Korea for assembly, 17.5 %  
to Japan for components and advanced technology, 7.5 % to Germany for design, 4 % to 
Taiwan and Singapore for minor parts, 2.5 % to the UK for advertising and marketing services   Back to Normal? The Future of Global Production Networks  121 
and 1.5 % to Ireland and Barbados for data processing. Only 37 % of the production value is 
generated in the United States.” 
Another illustration is provided by Linden et al. (2007) who determine the source of inputs 
for an iPod, sold by the US company Apple. They estimate that the hard-drive, produced by 
the Japanese company Toshiba using affiliates based in China accounts for 51 per cent of 
the cost of all iPod parts. The display module and display driver, produced by Japanese com-
panies in Japan, account for 16 per cent of input costs. 2 per cent of the value of inputs are 
supplied by Samsung, a Korean company producing the input in Korea. The final assembly, 
accounting for 3 per cent of the input cost, is carried out by a Taiwanese company in a plant 
in China. The source of 20 per cent of inputs cannot be determined by the researchers. This 
leaves 9  per  cent of input costs that are supplied by US firms, who provide the video/ 
multimedia processor as well as the portal player CPU. The former input is produced, 
however, in either Singapore or Taiwan, while the CPU may stem from production plants in 
either the US or Taiwan. This, hence, shows again the importance of global production 
networks in the assembly of an iPod. 
Examining the importance of such production sharing at a more aggregate level is not 
straightforward, as no harmonized and internationally comparable statistics are available. 
Hummels et al. (2001) proposed a method that enables them to gauge the magnitude of 
what they refer to as “vertical specialization”. This is based on the idea that such global pro-
duction sharing involves that at least one stage of production that relies on imported inputs, 
and that some share of the production is exported. Applied to Apple’s iPod, consider that 
China imports many inputs and then assembles the iPod, which is then exported to the US or 
indeed other countries. From the point of view of the US, Apple imports the final assembled 
product and then exports the final good (after some marketing) to final customers in Europe 
and elsewhere. 
This logic can be applied to aggregate trade data, and one can measure the importance of 
imports for exports in a given industry and country. Figure 2 provides some evidence on the 
imported intermediate input content of exports for a number of European countries, Canada 
and the United States, calculated using the Hummels et al. (2001) method based on data 
from national input-output tables. 
The data show that vertical specialization is widespread among these industrialized 
countries. It is also apparent, however, that the magnitude of global production sharing dif-
fers across countries. In Ireland, vertical specialization accounts for almost 60 per cent of 
exports, while in the US the corresponding figure is around 10 per cent. It is obvious that it is 
mainly the smaller countries (Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden) that engage in more pro-
nounced levels of vertical specialization. 
Vertical specialization has grown in some, but not in all countries. For example, from 1990 
to 2005, the share of vertical specialization in total German exports has almost doubled, 
while it remained almost constant in the US. The UK even experienced a slight decrease in 
this measure over that period. Unfortunately, we cannot calculate these figures for years later 
than 2005, as the underlying input-output data are not available yet. 
An alternative indicator of global production sharing is provided by Eurostat, using   
results from a survey on international sourcing behaviour of European firms with more than 122  After the Crisis: New Patterns in the World Economy 
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Figure 3: Level of International Sourcing of Enterprises during 2001–2006 and Planned 
International Sourcing 2007–2009 
 
Source: Eurostat: International Sourcing in Europe, Statistics in Focus 4/2009. 
100 employees. Figure 3, taken from their publication, shows in the blue columns the share 
of surveyed firms having sourced inputs internationally during the period 2001 to 2006. (We 
will come back to the other column in the discussion below.) It shows again that international 
sourcing is important for European firms, although the magnitude of the phenomena differ 
across countries. Most importantly, and in line with our findings above, Irish firms are the 
most prolific “outsourcers” in the European comparison. The survey also shows that inter-  Back to Normal? The Future of Global Production Networks  123 
national sourcing is highly important for British firms. While this may seem at odds with 
Figure 2, it is important to point out that Figure 3 shows the incidence of international sourc-
ing, i.e., the number of firms engaged in the activity, rather than the level of outsourcing. In 
Germany, only roughly 15 per cent of firms source their inputs abroad. 
Global Production Networks During the Crisis 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure with any precision what happens to the extent of 
global production networks when adjustments to the crisis are still ongoing. Furthermore, 
there are no consistent up-to-date data available that would, for example, enable us to 
calculate measures of vertical specialization as done in Figure 2. There are, however, some 
sound economic reasons for why one would expect that vertical specialization has fallen as a 
result of the crisis. We discuss two in turn. 
The first reason is the fall in exports. The financial crisis has translated into a world-wide 
drop in consumer spending. Since consumers demand not only locally produced goods but 
also exports, this has led to a quite substantial decrease in export activity in world exports, as 
shown above in Figure 1, especially in North America, Europe and the far East. For example, 
Yi (2009) reports that exports in the US fell by an annual rate of 43 per cent during the fourth 
quarter of 2008. The corresponding figure for Germany is a drop by just over 80 per cent. 
Given the existence of vertical production chains, or global production networks described 
above, a fall in exports of final goods also implies lower demand for intermediate inputs, and 
hence a decrease in the value of vertical specialization. Indeed, a number of economists, for 
example Yi (2009), have recently voiced their opinion that the rapid decline in exports is 
partly due to the importance of vertical specialization, where the drop in demand for the final 
good induces a domino effect on to intermediate inputs. Hence, the strong collapse in 
exports in the recent month is at least partly driven by the same forces that allowed global 
trade to expand much faster than global GDP in the last two decades, i.e. global production 
networks. 
The second reason concerns availability of financing instruments related to trade. Access 
to services in general, and financial services in particular, are vitally important for exports and 
imports. Firms need access to available bank loans in order to finance imports of inter-
mediate goods that will only after some value adding and sale translate into revenues. 
Furthermore, exporters are dependent on access to finance in order to bridge the gap 
between the date of invoice and the receipt of the payment, which may only happen with a 
substantial delay when interacting with customers abroad. Furthermore financial instruments 
like letters of credit play an important role as insurance against default of the buyer or any 
risk in international transactions.  
Due to the financial crisis banks in need of liquidity in an uncertain environment, tend to 
be much more reluctant to provide such credit easily. This implies that exporting and im-
porting are additionally constrained: a further reason to expect that some global production 
networks are hurt during the financial crisis. 124  After the Crisis: New Patterns in the World Economy 
Some anecdotal evidence illustrates the potential severity of the problem. The Financial 
Times, for example, has recently announced that Sony plans to halve its supplier networks in 
an effort to cut costs in order to deal with the slump in sales. Specifically, Sony plans to 
reduce its current network of roughly 2,500 suppliers to about 1,200 by March 2011 with the 
expectation of cutting its procurement costs by roughly $ 5.3bn as a result. Ford is also 
quoted by the Financial Times as engaging in a similar exercise. They have cut back from 
more than 3,000 suppliers to around 2,000, with a target of reducing this further to 750. Indeed, 
Ford’s procurement chief is quoted as saying that he expects “more stress in the supply base 
in the short term, not less”. For the International Herald´s Tribune, Hiroko Tabuchi reports 
that Japanese small and midsize exports of intermediate components are the most vulnerable 
to the global downturn. They supply many firms abroad and are at the “heart of the 
economy”. 
If these cases are anything to go by, then international sourcing and global production 
networks may become somewhat less important as a result of the financial crisis. Moreover, 
the value of foreign nodes in global international networks should be lost for all participants of 
these networks. 
Back to “Business as Usual” After the Crisis? 
If some global production networks do in fact decline during the crisis, the important question 
becomes: what will happen afterwards? There are two views on this: one, things will be back 
to business as usual, as suggested by the standard economic model directly applied to the 
current situation. The other view is that, no it will not – or at least not so easily and so quickly. 
Let us discuss these two views in turn. 
Proponents of the first view would argue that during the financial crisis exports have fallen 
so dramatically because of the existence of global production sharing and the associated 
domino effect – lower exports of final goods also imply fewer imports of intermediate 
products. This has dire implications for international sourcing during the crisis, but there is an 
optimistic ending. The argument goes that, once the crisis is over and global demand picks 
up again, exports of final goods will rise again and with it global production networks. Export 
producers will need to source inputs, and they will source them, as before the crisis, from 
suppliers world-wide. If the domino effect works adversely in the time of crisis, it works posi-
tively in the time after the crisis. 
The second view is somewhat more pessimistic. Recent work in international economics, 
using both theoretical analysis and careful evaluation of firm level data tells us that “sunk 
costs matter”. This means, in a nutshell, that export and the setting up of global production 
networks involve substantial set up costs, which can to a large extent not be recouped once 
a firm leaves the export market or terminates its international customer-supplier relation-
ships. Examples of this are costs for market research, searching for adequate suppliers 
abroad, setting up foreign distribution and sourcing networks, paying for lawyers versed in 
the law of the foreign country, etc. While setting up a global production network means that 
the firm has covered these costs and got the knowledge, the value of this knowledge tends to   Back to Normal? The Future of Global Production Networks  125 
depreciate rather quickly once the firm leaves the export market, or stops international 
sourcing. 
The empirical relevance of this argument is illustrated forcefully in a study on Colombian 
exporters by Roberts and Tybout (1997), showing the response of exporters to changes in 
the Colombian peso exchange rate. The study shows that there was substantial exit of 
exporters during an appreciation of the Peso lasting up to 1984. A following much stronger 
depreciation of the currency, after 1984, however, only led to a much lower rate of re- 
entry into export markets. In other words, firms that were out of the export market where  
reluctant – or unable – to get back in. That study also carefully quantifies the importance of 
sunk costs. A firm was 60 per cent more likely to be an exporter if it also was one in the 
previous period. However, once a firm quitted the export market for longer than one year, it 
was just as likely as a domestic firm that never exported before, to re-enter the export 
market. This points at how important it is for a firm to stay in the export market. 
While there is no equivalent study for global production networks, it is very likely that a 
similar mechanism would be at work. As pointed out above, both exports and international 
sourcing involve substantial sunk costs of a similar nature. Once out of the sourcing market, 
much of these costs would have to be borne again by a firm wishing to re-enter after a 
pause. Let us assume that sunk costs are as important for international sourcing as they are 
for exporting. This would imply that, as in the Colombian case, firms that drop out of their 
international sourcing network for more than one year, are as likely to re-establish global 
production networks as are firms that never engaged in international sourcing before. This 
brings us back to Figure 3 above. Interestingly, the survey on which this figure is based also 
includes firms that did not do any international sourcing before. These firms were asked how 
many of them were planning to do so in the future. The green column in Figure 3 reports the 
percentage of firms that were planning to start international sourcing. This is below five 
per  cent in most cases.1 So among those firms that never engaged in any international 
sourcing, the probability of starting to do so is definitely quite low. This probability may be 
similarly low for firms that did do some international sourcing before, but quitted it for a year 
or more. 
What does this imply? If, as a result of the international crisis, demand for exports falls 
dramatically and a firm stops sourcing inputs internationally, then re-entrance into inter-
national sourcing will be seriously hampered, even if foreign demand picks up again. So, 
once a firm stops, the concern is that it is going to be hard to re-establish foreign trade nodes 
and get back in. A firm may be likely to decide not to re-establish global production networks 
again, or, at least, it is likely to take some time before it is able to do so. Hence, the inter-
national crisis may have consequences that go well beyond the prediction of a standard 
economic model, when the presence of global production networks and sunk costs of 
building foreign trade nodes are taken into account. 
____________________ 
1  This survey was undertaken in 2006, before the crisis started. Were it taken today, one may expect 
even lower numbers wishing to start international sourcing. 126  After the Crisis: New Patterns in the World Economy 
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